The Helms-Burton Blocking Statute of the European Union by Huber LLM, Jürgen
Fordham International Law Journal
Volume 20, Issue 3 1996 Article 6




Copyright c©1996 by the authors. Fordham International Law Journal is produced by The Berke-
ley Electronic Press (bepress). http://ir.lawnet.fordham.edu/ilj




According to European Community (”EC”) law, the initiative for legislation lies with the
Commission of the European Communities (“Commission”). Therefore, on July 31, 1996, the
Commission submitted to the Council of the European Union a “proposal for a Council regulation
protecting against the effects of the application of certain legislation of certain third countries, and
actions based thereon or resulting therefrom.” After long and intensive discussions by the Commit-
tee of Permanent Representatives of the Member States (“COREPER”) and at the ministerial level,
which proved to be difficult due to political and legal reasons, the Council, during its October 28,
1996 session, arrived at a political agreement in Council Regulation 2771/96 (“Regulation”). The
Regulation aimed to “protect[ ] against the effects of the extra-territorial application of legislation
adopted by a third country, and actions based thereon or resulting therefrom.” The Council based
this Regulation on Articles 73c, 113, and 235 of the Treaty Establishing the European Community
(“EC Treaty”). The Council believed that this piece of Community legislation did not cover all
areas of activities that needed protection, and, therefore, the Council also adopted a Joint Action
based on Articles J.3 and K.3 of the Treaty on European Union (“TEU”). The official adoption of
this Regulation and of this Joint Action by the Council took place on November 25, 1996 after
legal linguistic experts had finalized the legal texts. Part I of this Essay sets out the content of
these European Union acts. Part II analyzes the legal problems which occurred during the Council
deliberations in relation to Community and EU law.
THE HELMS-BURTON BLOCKING STATUTE
OF THE EUROPEAN UNION
Dr. Ji'rgen Huber, LL.M. *
INTRODUCTION
After the U.S. Congress passed the Cuban Liberty and Dem-
ocratic Solidarity (LIBERTAD) Act' ("Helms-Burton Act") in
March of 1996, the Council of the European Union ("Council"),
during its July 15, 1996 session, identified a range of measures
that the European Union could deploy in response to the darn-
age EU companies incurred from the implementation of the
Helms-Burton Act. The Council identified the introduction of
legislation by the European Union with the objective of neutral-
izing the extra-territorial effects of the U.S. legislation.
According to EC law, the initiative for legislation lies with
the Commission of the European Communities ("Commis-
sion").' Therefore, on July 31, 1996, the Commission submitted
to the Council a "proposal for a Council regulation protecting
against the effects of the application of certain legislation of cer-
tain third countries, and actions based thereon or resulting
therefrom."3 After long and intensive discussions by the Com-
mittee of Permanent Representatives of the Member States
("COREPER")4 and at the ministerial level, which proved to be
* The author is a member of the Legal Service of the Council of the European
Union. He expresses purely personal views which do not necessarily reflect those of the
Council.
1. Pub. L. No. 104-114, 110 Stat. 785 (1996) (codified at 22 U.S.C. §§ 6021 et. seq.
(1996)) [hereinafter Helms-Burton Act].
2. Under Title V, Provisions on a Common Foreign and Security Policy, and Title
VI, Provisions on Co-operation in the Fields of Justice and Home Affairs of the Treaty
on European Union, individual Member States may take the initiative forJoint Actions
(art. J.3 and J.8 (8)), programs implemented to further the objectives of the common
foreign and security policy of the European Community which are passed in areas of
common interest to and binding on the Member States. Treaty on European Union,
Feb. 7, 1992, art.J.3, K3, O.J. C 224/1, 94-95, 97-98 (1992), [1992] 1 C.M.L.R. 719, 730-
31, 736, 31 I.L.M. 247 [hereinafter TEU] (amending Treaty Establishing the European
Economic Community, Mar. 25, 1957, 298 U.N.T.S. 11, 1973 Gr. Brit. T.S. No. 1 (Cmd.
5179-I) [hereinafter EEC Treaty], as amended by Single European Act, O.J. L 169/1
(1987), [1987] 2 C.M.L.R. 741 [hereinafter SEA], in TREAnrS ESTAuSHING THE EURO.
PEAN COMMUNITIES (EC OWl Pub. Off. 1987)).
3. OJ. C 296/10 (1996).
4. The "Committee of Permanent Representatives of the Member States
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difficult due to political and legal reasons, the Council, during
its October 28, 1996 session, arrived at a political agreement in
Council Regulation 2771/96' ("Regulation"). The Regulation
aimed to "protect[ ] against the effects of the extra-territorial ap-
plication of legislation adopted by a third country, and actions
based thereon or resulting therefrom."6 The Council based this
Regulation on Articles 73c, 113, and 235 of the Treaty Establish-
ing the European Community ("EC Treaty"). 7 The Council be-
lieved that this piece of Community legislation did not cover all
areas of activities that needed protection, and, therefore, the
Council also adopted a Joint Action' based on Articles J.3 and
K3 of the Treaty on European Union ("TEU").9
The official adoption of this Regulation and of this Joint
Action by the Council took place on November 25, 1996 after
legal linguistic experts had finalized the legal texts.10 Part I of
this Essay sets out the content of these EU acts. Part II analyzes
("COREPER") prepares and carries out the tasks assigned to it by the Council, acting as
a link between the Council and the Commission." Treaty Establishing the European
Community, Feb. 7, 1992, art. 151 (1), [1992] 1 C.M.L.R. 573, 681 [hereinafter EC
Treaty], incorporating changes made by TEU, supra note 2.
5. Council Regulation No. 2271/96, OJ. L 309/1 (1996).
6. Id.
7. EC Treaty, supra note 4, art. 73c., [1992] 1 C.M.L.R. at 621. Article 73c of the
EC Treaty provides:
Whilst endeavouring to achieve the objective of free movement of capital be-
tween member-States and third countries to the greatest extent possible and
without prejudice to the other Chapters of this Treaty, the Council may, acting
by a qualified majority on a proposal from the Commission, adopt measures
on the movement of capital to or from third countries involving direct invest-
ment (including investment in real estate), establishment, the provision of fi-
nancial services, or the admission of securities to capital markets.
Id. Additionally, Article 113 states, "the Commission shall submit proposals to the
Council for implementing the common commercial policy." Id. art. 113, (1992] 1
C.M.L.R. at 656. Furthermore, Article 235 asserts:
If action by the Community should prove necessary to attain, in the course of
the operation of the common market, one of the objectives of the Community
and this Treaty has not provided the necessary powers, the Council shall, act-
ing unanimously on a proposal from the Commission and after consulting the
European Parliament, take the approriate measures.
Id. art. 235, [1992] 1 C.M.L.R. at 716.
8. Joint Action of 22 November 1996, O.J. L 309/7 (1996) (hereinafter Joint Ac-
tion].
9. TEU, supra note 2, art. J.3, K.3, O.J. C 224/1, at 94-95, 97-98 (1992), [1992] 1
C.M.L.R. at 730-31, 736; Joint Action, supra note 8, pmbl., O.J. L 309/7, at 7 (1996).
10. Council Regulation No. 2271/96, supra note 5, O.J. L 309/1 (1996).
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the legal problems which occurred during the Council delibera-
tions in relation to Community and EU law.
I. THE CONTENT OF THE EU REGIME
A. Objectives of the Regulation
The EU Regulation and Joint Action are mainly concerned
with removing the adverse effects of Title III and Title IV of the
Helms-Burton Act.1' Under Title III of the Helms-Burton Act,
legal proceedings may be brought in the United States against
EU citizens or companies involved in the trafficking' 2 of prop-
erty formerly owned by U.S. citizens and confiscated by the Cu-
ban Government.'- In addition, Title III provides that such pro-
ceedings may lead to judgments against EU citizens to pay multi-
ple compensation to a U.S. party.14 Title IV provides for the
refusal of entry into the United States of persons involved in the
trafficking of confiscated property, including the spouses, minor
children, and agents thereof.15
The preamble of EC Regulation No. 2271/96 sets out the
reasons for its adoption.' 6 It recalls that the objectives of the
European Community include contributing to the harmonious
development of world trade, progressively abolishing restrictions
on international trade, and achieving, to the greatest extent pos-
sible, the free movements of capital.1 7 These two stated reasons
are linked directly to the scope of the Regulation, and they indi-
cate clearly that Articles 113 and 73c of the EC Treaty constitute,
together with Article 235, the legal basis of this act.'8 The pre-
amble then sets out, "a third country has enacted certain laws
which purport to regulate activities of persons under thejurisdic-
tion of the Member States,"' 9 and, "by their extra-territorial ap-
plication such laws... violate international law and impede the
11. Helms-Burton Act, 22 U.S.CA §§ 6081-85 (1996).
12. See id. § 6023 (13) (A) (i) (1996) (defining trafficking as use, sale, transfer, con-
trol, management, and other activities that benefit persons).
13. Id. §§ 6081-85 (1996).
14. Id.
15. Id. § 6091 (1996).
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attainment of the aforementioned objectives." 2 0 The preamble
further states that these laws "affect or are likely to affect the
established legal order and have adverse effect on the interests
of natural and legal persons exercising rights under the [EC
Treaty] ."21
The preamble then proceeds to state:
Under these exceptional circumstances, it is necessary to take
action at the Community level to protect the established legal
order, the interests of the Community and the interests of the
said natural and legal persons, in particular by removing,
neutralizing, blocking or otherwise countering the effects of
the foreign legislation concerned. 2
Finally, the preamble makes a cross reference to the Joint Action
the Council adopted on the same day and indicates that the pur-
pose of the Joint Action is to ensure that Member States take
measures to protect those persons whose interests the foreign
legislation affects insofar as this Regulation does not protect
those interests.
B. Scope of the Regulation
Articles 1 and 11 of the Regulation determine its scope. Ac-
cording to Article 1, the Regulation provides protection against
the extra-territorial application of the laws specified in the an-
nex.23 The Regulation provides protection where such applica-
tion affects the interests of persons, referred to in Article 11,24
who engage in international trade or the movement of capital
and related commercial activities between the European Com-
munity and third countries."
Article 11 provides for wide coverage of the Regulation.
Paragraph one covers all nationals of Member States who are
residents in the European Community, whether they are found




23. These are the Helms-Burton Act, 22 U.S.C.A. §§ 6021 et seq. (1996), and the
D'Amato Act ("Iran and Libya Sanctions Act of 1996"), Pub. L. No. 104-172, 110 Stat.
1541 (1995) (codified at 50 U.S.C. § 1701 (1996)).
24. Council Regulation No. 2271/96, supra note 5, art. 11, O.J. L 309/1, at 3
(1996).
25. Id. art. 1, O.J. L 309/1, at 2 (1996).
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inside or outside the European Community.26 Paragraph four
includes any natural person who is a citizen of a third country
and a resident in the European Community, wherever that per-
son is found, unless that person is in the country of which he is a
national. 7 Paragraph five embraces any other natural person
present in the European Community, who is not a resident of
the European Community, if that person acts in a professional
capacity.28 Paragraph five would cover such person if he is on a
business trip in the European Community, but not if he stays in
the European Community as a tourist.29 Paragraph two encom-
passes any legal person incorporated within the European Com-
munity."0 Finally, paragraph three covers any natural or legal
person referred to in Article 1(2) of Regulation (EEC)
No. 4055/86, an EC Regulation on maritime transport.3 ' It fol-
lows from the above that all five paragraphs establish a clear link
between the persons the Regulation covers and the European
Community, either through nationality,32 residency,3s physical
presence,3 incorporation,35 or control3 6 It must, however, be
stressed that the Regulation only protects these persons if they
are engaging in one of the activities referred to in Article 1.
26. Id. art. 11.1, O.J. L 309/1, at 3 (1996).
27. Id. art 11.4, O.J. L 309/1, at 4 (1996).
28. Council Regulation No. 2271/96, supra note 5, art. 11.5, O.J. L 309/1, at 4
(1996).
29. Id.
30. Id. art. 11.2, O.J. L 309/1, at 4 (1996).
31. Id. art. 11.3, O.J. L 309/1, at 4 (1996); Council Regulation No. 4055/86, O.J. L
378/1, at 1 (1986) (stating "applying the principle of freedom to provide services to
maritime transport between Member States and between Member States and third
countries"). Article 1(2) of Council Regulation 4055/86 stipulates the following:
The provisions of this Regulation shall also apply to nationals of the Member
States established outside the Community and to shipping companies estab-
lished outside the Community and controlled by nationals of a Member State,
if their vessels are registered in that Member State in accordance with its legis-
lation.
Council Regulation 4055/86, supra, art. 1(2), O.J. L 378/1, at 2 (1986).
32. Council Regulation No. 2271/96, supra note 5, art. 11.1, O.J. L 309/1, at 4
(1996).
33. Id. art. 11.1, 11.4, O.J. L 309/1, at 3-4 (1996).
34. Id. art. 11.5, O.J. L 309/1, at 4 (1996).
35. Id. art. 11.2, O.J. L 309/1, at 4 (1996).
36. Council Regulation No. 2271/96, supra note 5, art 11.3, O.J. L 309/1, at 4
(1996).
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C. The Substantive Rights and Obligations Created by the Regulation
Article 2 imposes upon any person referred to in Article 11
whose economic or financial interests the foreign legislation af-
fects, the obligation to inform the Commission accordingly
within thirty days.3 7 If a legal person is affected, this obligation
applies to directors and persons with management responsibili-
ties.3" This information is of essential importance to the Com-
mission in order to enable it to assess the impact of the Helms-
Burton Act on EU based companies.
According to Article 3, all information supplied may only be
used for the purposes for which it was provided.3 9 The Commis-
sion may, therefore, not disclose confidential information with-
out the express permission of the person providing the informa-
tion. This provision aims to counterbalance the obligation to
inform the Commission under Article 2 by creating a clear obli-
gation for the Commission to respect the principle of confidenti-
ality.
The most important substantive provisions are contained in
Articles 4, 0 5,41 and 6.42 Article 4 prohibits, in categorical terms,
the recognition and enforcement of any judgment of a court as
well as any decision of an administrative authority located
outside of the European Community giving effect to the Helms-
Burton Act or the D'Amato Act or to actions based thereon or
resulting therefrom. 4 Article 4 clearly aims at preventing the
enforceability in the European Community ofjudgments of U.S.
courts based on Title III of the Helms-Burton Act and providing
for compensation against EU companies or natural persons.
Moreover, because Article 4 addresses decisions of administra-
tive authorities as well, it is also expected to apply to decisions
based on the D'Amato Act.
Article 5 provides for an obligation of non-compliance with
any requirement or prohibition, including requests of foreign
37. Id. art. 2, O.J. L 309/1, at 2 (1996).
38. Id.
39. Id. art. 3, O.J. L 309/1, at 2 (1996).
40. Council Regulation No. 2271/96, supra note 5, art. 4, O.J. L 309/1, at 2 (1996).
41. Id. art. 5, O.J. L 309/1, at 2 (1996).
42. Id. art. 6, o.J. L 309/1, at 2 (1996).
43. Id. art. 4, O.J. L 309/1, at 2 (1996).
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courts, based on the Helms-Burton Act and the D'Amato Act."
Under certain circumstances, however, non-compliance might
result in disproportionate damage to the person or company
concerned, and, thus, Article 5(2) provides for the possibility of
obtaining an authorization to comply to the extent that non-
compliance would seriously damage the interests of the person
concerned or those of the European Community.45 The Com-
mission may grant such authorization according to the proce-
dure set out in Article 8.1 Article 8 provides for a "comitology
decision" 47 in accordance with Procedure III variant (a) of the
Council Decision of July 13, 198748 laying down the procedures
for the exercise of implementing powers conferred on the Com-
mission.49
Article 6 represents the cornerstone of the whole Regula-
tion. It contains the so-called "claw-back" clause which enables
the persons referred to in Article 11 who are engaging in activi-
ties set out in Article 1 to recover any damages, including legal
costs, caused to that person by the application of the Helms-Bur-
ton Act.5" The claimant may recover from the natural or legal
person, a person acting on its behalf or as an intermediary, or
44. Council Regulation No. 2271/96, supra note 5, art. 5, OJ. L 309/1, at 2 (1996).
Article 5 provides:
No person referred to in Article 11 shall comply, whether directly or through a
subsidiary or other intermediary person, actively or by deliberate omission,
with any requirement or prohibition, including requests of foreign courts,
based on or resulting, directly or indirectly, form the laws specified in the
Annex or from actions based thereon or resulting therefrom.
Id.
45. Id. art. 5, 1 2, o.J. L 309/1, at 2 (1996).
46. Id. art. 8, OJ. L 309/1, at 3 (1996).
47. Id. Without going into specific details of this complicated "comitology",
under a type III variant (a) the Commission first submits to the committee a draft of the
measure it will likely take. Council Decision of 13 July 1987, O.J. L 197/33, 34 (1987).
For example, in the present case a draft to grant the authorization of compliance is
submitted. Next, the Committee delivers its opinion by qualified majority. Id.; see EC
Treaty, supra note 4, art. 148(2), [1992] 1 C.M.L.R. at 680. If the measure envisaged
corresponds to the opinion of the Committee, the Commission adopts the measure.
Council Decision of 13 July 1987, OJ. L 197/33, at 34. If the Commission's draft mea-
sure is not in accordance with the opinion of the Committee or if the Committee deliv-
ers no opinion, the Commission must submit to the Council a proposal relating to that
measure. Id. If the Council has not acted by qualified majority within two weeks, the
Commission adopts the proposed measures. Id.
48. Council Decision of 13 July 1987, O.J. L 197/33,34 (1987).
49. Id.
50. Council Regulation 2271/96, supra note 5, art. 6, O.J. L 309/1, at 2-3 (1996).
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any other entity causing the damages. 5' It is important to note
that this provision does not allow recovery from a company in-
corporated within the European Community in accordance with
the laws of a Member State, if a U.S. based company of which the
EU company is a subsidiary caused the damage.5" Indeed, under
Community law such a subsidiary is an EU based company and
legally to be distinguished from the U.S. based company.
Article 6(3) creates a new special jurisdiction not foreseen
in the Brussels Convention on Jurisdiction and Enforcement of
Judgments in Civil and Commercial Matters53 insofar as it allows
for judicial proceedings to be brought in the courts of any Mem-
ber State where the defendant holds assets.54 According to Arti-
cle 6(4), without prejudice to other means available, the recov-
ery may take the form of seizure and sale of defendant's assets
within the European Community, including shares held in a
legal person incorporated within the European Community.55 It
follows from these provisions that, for example, any damage
General Motors causes to an EU based company could not be
recovered from Opel, Germany, as that company is a separate
legal person incorporated in the European Union, but any
shares held by General Motors in the Opel company could be
seized if held within the European Community.
In order to make sure that the provisions of the Regulation
will be effective, the Council believed it was indispensable to pro-
vide for sanctions in case of a breach of "any relevant provision"
of the Regulation. While it would have been legally possible to
specify such sanctions directly in the Regulation, Article 9 im-
poses on a Member State the task of determining those sanc-
tions.5 6 The Regulation provides, however, that the sanctions
must be effective, proportional, and dissuasive.57
Because the Regulation does not cover all persons and areas
of activities which the Commission had proposed and which
51. Id.
52. Id.
53. Brussels Convention on Jurisdiction and Enforcement of Judgments in Civil
and Commercial Matters, J.O. L 299/32 (1972), amended by OJ. L 304/77 (1978),
amended by OJ. L 388/1 (1982), amended by O.J. L 285/1 (1989).
54. Council Regulation 2271/96, supra note 5, art. 6, 3, O.J. L 309/1, at 3
(1996).
55. Id. art. 6, 1 4, O.J. L 309/1, at 3 (1996).
56. Id. art. 9, OJ. L 309/1, at 3 (1996).
57. Id.
HELMS-BURTON BLOCKING STATUTE
Council and Member States wanted to protect, it alone would
not have been an adequate response to the Helms-Burton Act
and the D'Amato Act. Therefore, the Council, on the same day
it adopted the Regulation, adopted ajoint Action 58 based on Ar-
ticles J.3 and K3 of the TEU. 59 The Joint Action provides that
each Member State shall take the measures it deems necessary to
protect the interests of any person referred to in Article 11 of
the Regulation that the Helms-Burton Act or the D'Amato Act
affects, insofar as the Regulation does not protect these inter-
ests.6°
The preamble of thatJoint Action states that it and the Reg-
ulation "constitute together an integrated system involving the
Community and the Member States each in accordance with its
own powers."61 In order to fully understand the construction of
this integrated system and the legal relation between the Regula-
tion and the Joint Action, it is necessary to proceed with a legal
analysis of these two pieces of legislation paying particular atten-
tion to their legal basis under the EC Treaty and the TEU.
II. LEGAL ISSUES
The proposal which the Commission submitted to the
Council on July 31, 199662 for the adoption of a "Helms-Burton
blocking statute" was based on Articles 113 and 235 EC Treaty.63
Article 1 of the proposal provided for protection against the ex-
tra-territorial effects of the Helms-Burton Act" and the Commis-
sion intended the Regulation to be applicable to any natural or
legal person resident or incorporated within the European Com-
munity. The Commission suggested no Joint Action because it
believed that the Regulation would cover all persons and activi-
ties which had to be protected. This proposal immediately
raised legal problems within the Council. The main issues fac-
ing the Council were whether the Community was competent to
adopt the measures proposed and, if yes, what scope could the
Regulation have under Community law.
58. Joint Action, supra note 8, OJ. L 309/7, at 7 (1996).
59. Id.
60. Id. art. 1, OJ. L 309/7, at 7 (1996).
61. Id. pmbl, O.J. L 309/7, at 7 (1996).
62. o. C. 296/10 (1996).
63. See EC Treaty, supra note 4, art. 113, 235, [1992] 1 C.M.L.R. at 656, 716.
64. Helms-Burton Act, 22 U.S.CA. §§ 6021 et seq. (1996).
1997]
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It was clear from the outset that the measures proposed
went far beyond the common commercial policy. Measures
adopted under Article 113 of the EC Treaty must deal specifi-
cally with international trade and the proposed measures did
not."5 The proposal was supposed to protect all persons the
Helms-Burton Act affected and not only those engaging in inter-
national trade. It provided for remedies, especially in Articles 4,
5, and 6, which are not available under Article 113. It would also
have covered persons engaging in activities which fall under
Member State competence.
The addition of Article 23566 as a legal basis could not rem-
edy this situation. According to well-established jurisprudence
of the Court of Justice, Article 235 cannot serve as a basis for
widening the scope of the EC Treaty.67 Action may be based on
Article 235 only where it falls within EC competence and where
the EC Treaty does not provide any specific power for that pur-
pose. Nor does Article 235 permit the use of all remedies indis-
criminately. The European Community remains bound by the
other rules the EC Treaty set, in particular, the principles of le-
gality, subsidiarity, and proportionality.
The first question to be addressed is whether the EC Treaty
provides any specific power elsewhere which would have allowed
the adoption of the Commission's original proposal. One
might, in this context, think of Article 228a of the EC Treaty.6 8
65. EC Treaty, supra note 4, art.. 113, [1992] 1 C.M.L.R. at 656. Article 113 deals
with the common commercial policy of the European Community and asserts:
[t] he common commercial policy shall be based on uniform principles, partic-
ularly in regard to changes in tariff rates, the conclusion of tariff and trade
agreements, the achievement of uniformity in measures of liberalisation, ex-
port policy and measures to protect trade such as those to be taken in case of
dumping or subsidies.
Id.; see Opinion 1/94, [1994] E.C.R. 1-5267, 5405, 57.
66. EC Treaty, supra note 4, art. 235, [1992] 1 C.M.L.R. at 716.
67. See Re the Accession of the Community to the European Human Rights Com-
mission (Opinion 2/94), [1996] E.C.R. 1-1759, [1996] 2 C.M.L.R. 265.
68. EC Treaty, supra note 4, art. 228a, [1992] 1 C.M.L.R. at 715. Article 228a stipu-
lates:
Where it is provided, in a common position or in a joint action adopted ac-
cording to the provisions of the Treaty on European Union relating to the
common foreign and security policy, for an action by the Community to inter-
rupt or to reduce, in part or completely, economic relations with one or more
third countries, the Council shall take the necessary urgent measures. The
Council shall act by a qualified majority on a proposal from the Commission
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That provision, however, had not been conceived to create new
powers of the European Community every time a common posi-
tion or joint action under the Common Foreign and Security
Policy ("CFSP") provides for an action to interrupt or reduce
economic relations with a third country. Article 228a provides
for an action by the European Community.69 Therefore, the
existence of an EC competence, which must exist outside of Arti-
cle 228a, is a precondition for the application of Article 228a. In
addition, the Commission's proposal was in no way aimed at re-
ducing or interrupting the economic relations with the United
States, which would be a condition for the application of Arti-
cle 228a. This provision, therefore, clearly could not constitute
the correct legal basis for the Regulation as the Commission pro-
posed.
The Council was then confronted with a choice between sev-
eral options. The first option would have been to restrict the
scope of the Regulation to the objective of the common com-
mercial policy which is an exclusive EC competence under Arti-
cle 113 of the EC Treaty and, thus, limit the protection to per-
sons engaging in international trade. Under this approach, it
would still have been necessary to add Article 235 as a legal basis
because the remedies foreseen in Articles 4, 5, and 6 of the Reg-
ulation could only be adopted under that provision.7" This ap-
proach was considered much too narrow for an adequate re-
sponse of the European Community to the Helms-Burton Act.
Indeed, it would then have fallen to the individual Member
States to cover all the other persons that the law affected and all
person engaging in activities other than international trade.
A second option for the European Community would have
been to not limit its action to the objectives for which it has ex-
clusive competence, namely Article 113, but include other objec-
tives to be found elsewhere in the EC Treaty where the Euro-
pean Community has potential competence. The areas one
could think of in this context were, for example, Article 57
(right of establishment) 71 Article 59 (provision of services other
69. Id.
70. Id. art. 235, [1992] 1 C.M.L.R. at 716.
71. See EC Treaty, supra note 4, art. 52, 57, [1992] 1 C.M.L.R. at 613, 616. The
right of establishment governs self-employed persons such as doctors, lawyers, and ar-
chitects and allows them to pursue economic activities and establish practices in other
Member States. ERic STEIN ET AL., EUROPEAN COMMUNrIY LAW & INSTITUTIONS IN PER-
1997] 709
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than cross-border services which are covered by Article 113),72
Articles 73b and 73c (free movement of capital) ,7  Article 73
(transport) 7' as well as Article 100a (approximation of legisla-
tion for the establishment or functioning of the internal mar-
ket) .75
Under this approach, the legal basis would have been a
whole range of articles together with Article 235. This approach
was inconvenient because it would have had important proce-
dural implications which would have delayed the adoption of the
Regulation by months. Indeed, the inclusion of Articles 57, 59,
and 100a would have meant that the co-decision procedure
76
with the EC Parliament would have had to be applied, while the
inclusion of Article 75 would have required the cooperation pro-
cedure with the Parliament.77 Furthermore, if all these articles
had been included, the wording of the definition of the scope of
the Regulation in Article 1 would have been extremely compli-
cated and might have blurred the exact delineation between the
Regulation and the Joint Action. A third option for the Council
would have been to base the proposed Regulation on Arti-
cle 228a of the EC Treaty.78 This option had to be ruled out
because of the legal grounds set out above.79
In the end, the Council chose an intermediate solution.
Rather than limit its action to the objectives covered by the ex-
clusive EC competence under the common commercial policy,"
the Council added the objective of Article 73c, concerning the
free movement of capital between Member States and third
countries. The preamble and especially Article 1, which defines
the scope of protection of the Regulation, clearly illustrate the
Council's choice. Indeed, Article 1 limits the application of the
SPECTIVE 489 (1967); PJ.G. KAPTEYN & P. VERLOREN VAN THEMAAT, INTRODUCTION TO
THE LAw OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES 76 (Laurence Gormley ed., 2d ed. 1989).
72. Id. art. 59, [1992] 1 C.M.L.R. at 616.
73. Id. art. 73b, 73c, [1992] 1 C.M.LR. at 621.
74. Id. art. 75, [1992] 1 C.M.L.P. at 623-24.
75. EC Treaty, supra note 4, art. 1O0a, [1992] 1 C.M.L.R. at 633-34.
76. See id. art. 189b, [1992] 1 C.M.L.R. at 694 (outlining co-decision procedure
between Commission, Council, and Parliament).
77. See id. art. 189c, [1992] 1 C.M.L.R. at 696 (detailing cooperation procedure
with Parliament).
78. Id. art. 228a, [1992] 1 C.M.L.R. at 715.
79. See supra notes 68-69 and accompanying text (discussing Article 228a and legal
grounds for not utilizing it).
80. EC Treaty, supra note 4, art. 113, [1992] 1 C.M.L.R. at 656.
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Regulation to persons "engaging in international trade and/or
the movement of capital and related commercial activities be-
tween the Community and third countries."8 1 The Member
States, in accordance with the Joint Action, would have to pro-
tect any other person affected by the Helms-Burton Act or the
D'Amato Act.
As neither Article 113 nor Article 73c provides for the reme-
dies envisaged in Articles 4, 5, and 6 of the Regulation, the ques-
tion became whether the addition of Article 235 as a legal basis
would allow the European Community to adopt these remedies
in an EC Act. Three conditions must be met in order to use
Article 235 as a basis for specific action. The action must aim to
achieve an EC objective, relate to the operation of the common
market, and be necessary.12
Regarding the Community objective, it follows clearly from
the wording of the text, particularly Article 1 and the preamble
recitals, that the Regulation does indeed aim to achieve Commu-
nity objectives covered by Articles 113 and 73c and is confined to
those objectives. The first recital expressly refers to the harmo-
nious development of world trade and to the abolition of restric-
tions on international trade.83 The second recital states that the
Community endeavors to achieve to the greatest extent possible
the objective of free movement of capital between Member
States and third countries.8 4 Article 1, for its part, provides pro-
tection for persons engaging in international trade or the move-
ment of capital to and from third countries and related commer-
cial activities.85
The operation of the common market is clearly at issue in
the areas the Regulation covers. If some nationals of Member
States engaging in investments or trade connected with Cuba
were to be subject to U.S. sanctions, whereas others investing in
other countries were not, the rights conferred by the EC Treaty
upon the first category of persons would be seriously impaired.
81. Council Regulation 2271/96, supra note 5, art. 1, O.J. L 309/1, at 2 (1996).
82. EC Treaty, supra note 4, art. 235, [1992] 1 C.M.L.R. at 716.
83. See EC Treaty, supra note 4, art. 110, [1992] 1 C.M.L.R. at 655 (stating "Mem-
ber-States aim to contribute, in the common interest, to the harmonious development
of world trade, the progressive abolition of restrictions on international trade. .. ").
84. See id. art. 73c(2), [1992] 1 C.M.L.R. at 621 (stating EC Treaty objective as
"endeavoring to achieve the objective of free movement of capital between Member-
States and third countries .... .").
85. Council Regulation 2271/96, supra note 4, art. 1, O.J. L 309/1, at 2 (1996).
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The Member States would be required to take national measures
individually in the areas the Regulation covers, thereby dis-
turbing the operation of the common market.
Assessing whether action is necessary is partly a legal and
partly a political matter. As to the legal aspects of the assess-
ment, the action must be necessary in order to enable the com-
mon market to continue to operate properly and must comply
with the principles of EC law, particularly subsidiarity and pro-
portionality. These conditions have been met. In the absence of
measures taken on a uniform basis by the European Community,
if Member States were to adopt unilateral measures in the areas
the Regulation covers, the common market would be disturbed.
Moreover, action of a more limited scope or intensity than that
provided for by the Regulation would not appear to ensure im-
plementation of the EC Treaty, particularly ensuring that the
common market and the common commercial policy continue
to operate. The action envisaged, including Articles 4, 5, and 6,
would seem to be the minimum needed to achieve those objec-
tives and to react effectively to the challenge facing the EC com-
mon market and the operation of that market.
These remedies, the use of which is, of course, limited to
the objective of the Regulation as determined by Articles 73c
and 113 of the EC Treaty and by Article 1 of the Regulation it-
self, are remedies legally available to the European Community.
The Council has already used similar remedies in a number of
earlier cases involving Iraq,86 Libya,8 7 Haiti 8 and the former Yu-
goslavia.89 Article 1 (2) (c) and (e) of these four regulations con-
tains provisions that roughly match Articles 4 and 5 of the Regu-
lation.9" Article 6 of the Regulation does not appear word for
word in the precedents, but is a logical consequence of Articles 4
and 5 and adds nothing in relation to the Community legisla-
tor's power to act. The four previous regulations were all
86. Council Regulation No. 3541/92, O.J. L 361/1 (1992).
87. Council Regulation No. 3275/93, O.J. L 295/4 (1993).
88. Council Regulation No. 1264/94, O.J. L 139/4 (1994).
89. Council Regulation No. 1733/94, O.J. L 182/1 (1994).
90. Compare Council Regulation No. 2271/96, supra note 5, art. 4, 5, OJ. L 309/1,
at 2 (1996) with Council Regulation No. 3541/92, supra note 86, art. 1 (2)(c), (e), O.J.
L 361/1, at 1-2 (1992); Council Regulation No. 3275/93, supra note 87, art. 1 (2)(c),
(e), O.J. L 295/4, at 4 (1993); Council Regulation No. 1264/94, supra note 88, art. 1
(2)(c), (e), 0.J. L 139/4, at 4 (1994); Council Regulation No. 1733/94, supra note 89,
art. 1 (2)(c), (e), 0.J. L 182/1, at 1 (1994).
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adopted unanimously without any disagreement on EC compe-
tence to adopt them.
These precedents may not be disregarded on the grounds
that the principal aim of the regulations was to prohibit trade
and that the provisions which correspond to Articles 4 and 5
were simply a means to that end. As stated above, the objective
of the measures provided for in the Regulation is a Community
objective within the meaning of Article 235, in that it directly
concerns the operation of the common market in the areas cov-
ered by Articles 73c and 113 of the EC Treaty.91 Therefore, the
question of the subsidiary nature of these measures does not
arise, because they are the objective of the Regulation. By their
nature, those measures also constituted one of the principal
objectives of the above precedents. Likewise, it is the operation
of the common market which is at issue now. The objective is no
doubt even clearer in legal terms than at the time of these prece-
dents.
That the Council further adopted the previous regulations
following U.N. Security Council resolutions92 obviously does not
affect this legal analysis. The provisions of the EC Treaty deter-
mine EC power to act and external factors such as the existence
of a U.N. Security Council resolution do not condition this
power. A U.N. decision could not have the legal effect of modi-
fying the EC Treaty to give the European Community compe-
tence that the EC Treaty does not confer upon it. EC compe-
tence, therefore, already existed legally, independent of whether
the United Nations adopted a resolution. Finally, the legal argu-
ment that it would be possible to take action on the basis of Ti-
tle VI of the TEU and that this action would rule out Community
actions is patently quite erroneous. Article M of the TEU clearly
establishes that Titles V and VI of the TEU cannot "affect" Com-
munity competence, much less call it into question.95
That leaves us with the question of where the exact border-
line has to be drawn between the Regulation and the Joint Ac-
tion which Member States must implement. This question is
mainly relevant as concerns the provision of services. In its
91. See supra notes 82-91 and accompanying text (explaining how Regulation re-
lates to operation of common market and is necessary under Article 235 of EC Treaty).
92. See supra notes 86-89 and accompanying text (discussing EC use of Council
Regulations to remedy situations involving Iraq, Libya, Haiti, and former Yugoslavia).
93. TEU, supra note 2, art. M, OJ. C 224/1, at 99, [1992] 1 C.M.L.R. at 738-39.
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Opinion 1/94,94 the Court ofJustice of the European Communi-
ties ruled that the cross-border provision of services is covered by
the common commercial policy and is, thus, an area of exclusive
EC competence of Article 113.91 Therefore, the Regulation cov-
ers persons engaging in this kind of activity in the same way as
persons engaging in trade of goods. The Regulation covers
other modes of the provision of services only to the extent that
they can be considered as "related commercial activities" in rela-
tion to international trade or the movement of capital as set out
in Article 1 of the Regulation. In order to understand what "re-
lated commercial activities" means, one has to take into account
that the legal basis of the Regulation, namely Articles 73c and
113, limit the scope of the Regulation to the objectives of those
two articles. 96 Thus, the essential objective of the Regulation is
to protect persons engaging in international trade or in the
movement of capital.
The related commercial activities which Article 1 of the Reg-
ulation also covers may, therefore, only be activities which are
linked inextricably to international trade or the movement of
capital and which, therefore, may be regarded as ancillary in re-
spect to the activities covered by Articles 73c and 113 of the EC
Treaty. In other terms, the provision of services under modes 2,
3, and 4 of Article 1 of the General Agreement on Trade in Serv-
ices97 ("GATS") normally would be covered only by the Regula-
tion if they were closely linked to an investment or other move-
ment of capital or to an activity in international trade. On the
other hand, the Regulation would not protect persons engaging
in other activities which may not be linked to an activity that
Articles 73c or 113 of the EC Treaty cover.98 This would be the
case, for example, where there is purely a provision of services
94. Opinion 1/94, [1994] E.C.R. at 1-5267, 5401, 44, [1995] 1 C.M.L.R. 205, 316.
95. Id. at 1-5401, 44, [1995] 1 C.M.L.R. at 316.
96. The objectives of these articles are goods and cross-border provision of services
(art. 113) as well as the free movement of capital between Member States and third
countries (art. 73c). See EC Treaty, supra note 4, art. 73c, 113, [1992] 1 C.M.L.R. at 621,
656. See also supra notes 80-88 and accompanying text (stating that Article 235 has been
added to Regulation in order to cover remedies provided for in Articles 4, 5, and 6 of
the Regulation and not falling within the limits of Articles 73c and 113).
97. General Agreement on Trade in Services, art. 1, 33 I.L.M. 44, 48 (1994).
98. Unless a Community competence can be based on the principles resulting
from the "AETR"jurisprudence. See EC Commission v. EC Council, Case 22/70, [1971]
E.C.R. 263, [1991] C.M.L.R. 335 [hereinafter AETR Case].
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through the presence of the service provider in Cuba, including
as a consultant, architect, or manager of a hotel. In the same
way, the Regulation only covers transport services to the extent
that they are linked to international trade or to a movement of
capital.
Member States, in accordance with the Joint Action, would
have to protect any other persons the Helms-Burton Act or the
D'Amato Act affected. The Joint Action does not specify which
measures the Member States may or must take to protect these
persons. They may clearly adopt measures which are similar to
those provided for in the Regulation. They are not limited, how-
ever, to such measures. Each Member State has to take the
measures it deems necessary. This leaves a large margin of ap-
preciation to each Member State. Because of the wide range of
measures available to the Member States under the Joint Action,
it was necessary to base it not only on ArticleJ.3 of the TEU99 but
also on Article K3(2) (b). 10 Indeed, some Member States might
want to take protective measures which consist of rules gov-
erning the crossing by persons of its external borders. Arti-
cle K1 (2) covers such measures10 1 and, therefore, the Joint Ac-
tion had to be based on Article K.3 as well. Furthermore, if
Member States want to adopt measures outside the scope of the
Regulation which correspond to Article 6 of the Regulation,
such measures would be subject to judicial cooperation in civil
matters as covered by Article K.1 point 6.102 For these reasons,
the Council has correctly based the Joint Action on Articles J.3
and K3 of the TEU.
99. See TEU, supra note 2, art. J.3, O.J. C 224/1 at 94-95, [1992] 1 C.M.L.R. at 730-
31 (laying out EC "procedure for adopting joint action in matters covered by the for-
eign and security policy ....- ).
100. See id. art. K3(2)(b), OJ. C 224/1 at 98, [1992] 1 C.M.L.R. at 736 (stating
that Council may "adopt joint actions insofar as the objectives of the Union can be
attained better by joint action than by Member States acting individually on account of
the scale or effects of the action envisaged . ").
101. See id. art. K.1(2), OJ. C 224/1, at 97, [1992] 1 C.M.L.R. at 735 (maintaining
that "rules governing the crossing by persons of the external borders of the Member
States" is area of common interest and as such, subject to cooperation).
102. See id. art. KI, O.J. C 224/1 at 97, [1992] 1 C.M.L.R. at 735 (stating that
"[f]or the purposes of achieving the objectives of the Union," Member States shall con-
sider judicial cooperation as matter of common interest).
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CONCLUSION
It follows from the above analysis that the integrated system
set up by the Council in adopting the Regulation together with a
Joint Action should, in theory, protect all those persons whose
interests are adversely affected by the application of the Helms-
Burton Act and the D'Amato Act. It is clear from the above anal-
ysis that the Regulation focuses mainly on neutralizing and re-
moving the adverse effects of the Helms-Burton Act, particularly
Title III of that act. The Regulation's provisions seem to be less
operational when it comes to countering the effects of the
D'Amato Act. For that reason, the Council and the Commission
committed themselves when they adopted the Regulation to take
the necessary action in the event that the Regulation and the
Joint Action will not provide sufficient remedies against the ef-
fects of the extra-territorial application of the laws specified in
the Annex of the Regulation. Only the future can tell whether
the system set up will be effective in practice. It is far too early to
evaluate what impact these pieces of EU legislation will actually
have on the protection of EU nationals and companies. It
should not be forgotten that Member States have to take meas-
ures themselves by legislating or otherwise in order to imple-
ment the Joint Action and to determine the sanctions to be im-
posed in the event of a breach of the provisions of the Regula-
tion. Moreover, it is too early to assess how the provision on
authorizations for compliance will operate, how many persons
will ask for such authorization, and how many authorizations will
be granted.
